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Laura Carlson, Stockholm / Sweden 
 
Critical Race Theory in a Swedish Context 
 
Abstract: Race has been a term avoided in the Swedish debates, while at the same time, protections 
with respect to unlawful discrimination on the basis of race or ethnic origins have not been vigilantly 
upheld by the courts. This paper looks at the treatment of race by the Swedish legislature, as well as 
the  treatment  by  the  courts,  specifically  the  Labour  Court,  with  respect  to  claims  of  unlawful 
discrimination in employment on the basis of ethnic origins, against the background of Critical Race 
Theory. The disparities between the intent of the legislature and the outcome of the cases brought to 
the  Swedish  courts  can  be  in  least  in  part  explained  through  the  lens  of  Critical  Race  Theory, 
particularly with respect to the liberal approach taken by the courts when applying the law. 
Keywords: “Critical Race Theory”, discrimination, race, “ethnic origins”, Swedish Labour Court, 
Sweden 
 
When enacting the most recent Discrimination Act (2008), the Swedish legislator deliberately 
removed the term “race” from the list of unlawful discrimination grounds. According to the 
legislative preparatory works to the act, this was to demonstrate that a biological concept of 
race is unacceptable: “[T]here is no scientific basis for dividing human beings into different 
races and from a biological perspective, consequently is there neither any reason to use the 
word  race  with  respect  to  human  beings.”
1  The  Parliament  also  stated  that  the  Swedish 
Government is to act in the international arena towards that the word “race”, as used with 
respect to human beings, to as great a degree as possible is avoided in official texts. The 
Government was also to review the extent to which the term “race” occurs in Swedish laws 
not based on international texts, and as far as possible, suggest a different term. To date, no 
such alternative term has been proposed, either by the Parliament or the Government. This 
“post-race” perspective by the Swedish Parliament can be juxtaposed against the judgments of 
the  Swedish  Labour  Court  (Arbetsdomstolen)  in  cases  raising  claims  of  unlawful  ethnic 
discrimination in employment. In one almost contemporaneous case, by way of example, the 
Labour Court found that statements by fellow workers, calling the plaintiff names such as 
Blackey, did not amount to unlawful ethnic discrimination in the workplace as the Court 
found that the plaintiff had consented to this banter.  
The paradox resulting from these examples appears irreconcilable, with the Parliament 
assuming  a  protection  that  the  courts  are  not  giving.  However,  when  evaluating  this 
                                                           
1 Legislative Bill 2007/08:95 at 119. 2 
discrepancy through the lens of Critical Race Theory, though still not desirable, the paradox 
becomes more understandable. Part One of this article sets out the legal theoretical framework 
addressing race as based on Critical Race Theory. Part Two explores the treatment of “race” 
as defined by these theories in the Swedish legislation and particularly the case law of the 
Swedish  Labour Court. The case law of the Swedish  Labour Court is chosen for several 
reasons. First, the initial claims brought to courts were under the statutory protections of the 
1994  act  against  discrimination  on  the  basis  of  race  and  ethnic  origins  in  the  field  of 
employment. Even if an employee not represented by a labor union or the ombudsman can 
bring such claims to the general trial courts, those judgments are then appealed to the Labour 
Court. In essence, the Labour Court is the ultimate arbitrator of such questions in the Swedish 
legal system within the area of employment law. The body of case law before the Labour 
Court is fairly developed, with approximately thirty cases having been brought in the past 
twenty years. 
A first definitional issue to be addressed by way of introduction is the terminological 
apparatus  that  has  been  created  around  discrimination.  Discrimination  is  a  part  of  every 
society, as identified by Critical Race Theory. Consequently, a distinction has to be made 
between  lawful  and  unlawful  discrimination.  For  example,  a  person  is  free  to  marry 
whomever he or she chooses, whether the decision is racially motivated or not. However, a 
state health care provider cannot refuse to provide healthcare due to a person’s color. The 
latter  has  been  defined  as  unlawful  discrimination  in  most  countries  seriously  addressing 
problems of discrimination. 
With respect to unlawful discrimination, two categories of unlawful discrimination have 
gradually  evolved  in  both  the  American  and  European  legal  systems,  direct 
discrimination/disparate  treatment,  and  indirect  discrimination/disparate  impact.  Direct 
discrimination/disparate  treatment  occurs  when  an  individual  or  legal  person  directly 
(explicitly) discriminates against another individual on the basis of a legally protected ground. 
With  the  passage  of  Title  VII  of  the  United  States  Civil  Rights  Act  in  1964,  legally 
recognized grounds included an individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
2 In 
Sweden,
3 the comparable protections were adopted piecemeal over a period of time, sex first 
                                                           
2 See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. Chap. 21 § 2000e-2(a)(1). Separate acts prohibit 
unlawful discrimination on the basis of age, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 29 U.S.C. 
Chap. 14, and on the basis of disability, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. Chap. 126. 
3 Due to Sweden’s membership in the EU as of 1995, Swedish legislation has to fill the requirements of 
European Union (“EU”) law. On the European Union law level, a protection was put into place as to equal pay 
between women in men in Article 117 of the Treaty of Rome already in 1957. As of 2000, protections are also in 
place as to unlawful discrimination on the basis of racial or ethnic origins, religion or belief, disability, age and 
sexual orientation. There is no comparable federal American legislation prohibiting unlawful discrimination on 3 
in 1979,
4 and race, color, nationality or ethnic origins initially in 1986.
5 Protections against 
direct discrimination/disparate treatment can be seen as the first generation of legal protection 
as to discriminatory behavior, banning explicit requirements based on any of these grounds, 
for example, prohibiting signs by employers stating that “Blacks need not apply” or “Gypsies 
not welcome.” 
Legal protections against indirect discrimination/disparate impact were first articulated 
by the United States Supreme Court in 1971 in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
6 and the parameters 
of the disparate impact analysis have since then been fashioned by the courts. In European 
Union  law,  indirect  discrimination  was  first  defined  by  legislation  in  the  1976  Equal 
Treatment Directive prohibiting unlawful direct and indirect discrimination on the basis of 
sex
7 and in 2000 with respect to racial or ethnic origins, religion or belief, disability, age and 
sexual  orientation.  Sweden  enacted  new  legislation  prohibiting  both  direct  and  indirect 
discrimination on the basis of ethnic origins, religion or faith in 1999, and amended its 1991 
Equality Act to include indirect discrimination on the basis of sex in 2000.
8  
Indirect  discrimination/disparate  impact  often  comprises  structural  discrimination  as 
recognized already by the United States Supreme Court in Griggs. One of the primary focuses 
of the theories examined here is this very structural discrimination, seen as a main source of 
the discriminatory behavior persisting to the present date. Institutions and institutional rules—
not simply customs, ideas, attitudes, culture, or private behavior—are viewed as shaping race 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the basis of sexual orientation, but certain states have adopted such legislation, see for example: California, 
Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Washington, Wisconsin and 
the District of Columbia. A few states have laws prohibiting sexual orientation discrimination only in public 
workplaces: Delaware, Indiana, Michigan, Montana, and Pennsylvania. 
4 Lag (SFS 1979:1118) om jämställdhet mellan kvinnor och män i arbetslivet (“1979 Equal Treatment Act”). 
This act was eventually replaced by the 1991 Equality Act, Jämställdhetslag (SFS 1991:433) and ultimately 
repealed by the 2008 Discrimination Act, Diskrimineringslag (SFS 2008:567) effective 1 January 2009. An 
English translation of the Swedish 2008 Discrimination Act is available at the website of the Government 
Offices of Sweden at www.sweden.gov.se. 
5 Lag (SFS 1986:442) mot etnisk diskriminering. This act was replaced in 1994 by an act of the same name, Lag 
(SFS 1994:134) mot etnisk diskriminering, and then again in 1999, Lag (SFS 1999:130) om åtgärder mot etnisk 
diskriminering i arbetslivet. The 1999 act was also ultimately repealed by the 2008 Discrimination Act. 
6 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (holding that under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. Chap. 21 § 2000 et seq., when workplace tests disparately impact ethnic minority employees, 
businesses must prove that the tests are consistent with business necessity and “reasonably related” to the jobs 
for which the tests are required). See also Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968)(holding that 
Section Two of the Thirteenth Amendment gives Congress the authority to prohibit private discrimination in the 
lease and sale of property).  
7 Council Directive 76/207/EEC of 9 February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of equal treatment 
for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working 
conditions (“Equal Treatment Directive”), OJ 1976 L 39/40, Celex No. 31976L0207. 
8 Lag (SFS 2000:773) om ändring i jämställdhetslagen (SFS 1991:433), Prop. 1999/2000:143 Ändringar i 
jämställdhetslagen m.m., Bet. 2000/01:AU3, Rskr. 2000/01:4. A new act prohibiting discrimination on the basis 
of race or religion was also passed in 1999, lag (SFS 1999:130) om åtgärder mot etnisk diskriminering i 
arbetslivet. These 1999 statutes were modeled on the 1991 Equal Treatment Between Women and Men Act. 4 
relations.
9 As institutional rules, the role  of the law has been seen as a pivotal force in both 
fighting  against  such  structural  discrimination  as  well  as  cementing  race  relations  and 
preventing progress for minorities.
10 
 
Part One: The Legal Theoretical Frameworks for Race 
Originating in Critical Legal Studies (“CLS”), and parallel to the developments in feminist 
legal theory, race became a focus of several legal theories beginning in the 1970’s, including 
Critical Race Theory, Post-Colonialism
11 and later Intersectionality. Each of these outsider 
critical theories (outcrits) shares the basic premise of treating individuals as the subjects of the 
theory  as  opposed  to  theoretical  objects.  The  use  of  the  term  “subject”  is,  however, 
problematic  in  itself  as  pointed  out  by  Foucault:  “There  are  two  meanings  of  the  word 
‘subject’: subject to someone else by control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by 
a conscience or self-knowledge. Both meanings suggest a form of power which subjugates 
and makes subject to.”
12 Recognizing and legitimating the experiences of the individual is 
seen by these theories as a step towards coming to terms with the historical treatment of 
certain  groups,  finding  atonement/resolution,  as  well  as  creating  a  tool  for  combating 
discrimination. 
 
I. The Origins of Critical Race Theory 
Critical Race Theory (CRT or Race Crits) has its historical roots in the late 1970’s, emerging 
as a new strategy for dealing with the post-civil rights racial structure in the United States. 
This structure was argued to be maintained by a colorblind ideology that hid and protected 
white privilege, while masking racism within the rhetoric of “meritocracy” and “fairness.” 
CRT emerged within this historical context as a framework aimed at undermining colorblind 
                                                           
9 J. Morgan Kousser, Colorblind Injustice: Minority Voting Rights and the Undoing of the Second 
Reconstruction (1999) at 1. 
10 For the American context, see Martha R. Mahoney, What’s Left of Solidarity? Reflections on Law, Race, and 
Labor History, 57 Buff.L.Rev. 1515 (2009). Mahoney argues that the dual developments in the case law 
rendered class-based interracial organizing difficult in labor history by making it difficult for workers to organize 
and strike and preventing states from giving workers effective protection in joining unions and for legislators to 
enact labor-protective regulation combined with cases limiting or striking down Reconstruction civil rights 
statutes that should have protected equality. According to Mahoney, this fostered racial division, promoted 
insecurity among workers, and placed burdens on class-based organizing. Id. at 1516. 
11 Given the constraints of this article, Post-Colonialism will not be examined closer here. For more information 
on this theory, see Leela Gandhi, Post-colonial Theory (Columbia Univ. Press 1998); Dipesh Chakrabarty, 
Provincializing Europe: Post-colonial Thought and Historical Difference (Princeton Univ. Press 2000); Chandra 
Talpade Mohanty, Feminism Without Borders: Decolonizing Theory, Practicing Solidarity (Duke Univ. Press 
2003). 
12 Michel Foucault, The Subject and Power, 8 Critical Inquiry 777 (1982) at 781. 5 
ideology through a deconstruction of its racist premise.
13 Lawyers, legal scholars and law 
students
14 across the United States felt that any of the gains made in the 1960’s civil-rights era 
had stymied and even in some situations had rolled back. The consensus was that new, more 
nuanced approaches were necessary in order to combat the types of subtle, unconscious, or 
institutional racism that existed, which were even more deeply entrenched and difficult to 
combat than the former overt variety.
15  
One of CRT’s most articulate proponents, Richard Delgado, traces the inception of CRT 
back to an article written by Derrick Bell in 1980, claiming that Bell startled the legal world 
with  his  article  entitled  Brown  v.  Board  of  Education  and  the  Interest  Convergence 
Dilemma.
16 Bell argued that the groundbreaking decision of Brown v. Board of Education was 
decided in favor of African Americans not because of any belated spasm of conscience on the 
part  of  the  Supreme  Court,  but  because  of  a  fortuitous  combination  of  material  and 
sociopolitical  circumstances.
17  Bell pointed out that the National Association for Colored 
Persons  (“NAACP”)  Legal  Defense  and  Education  Fund  had  been  litigating  school 
desegregation  cases  throughout  the  South  for  decades  and  achieving,  at  most,  narrow 
victories. Yet the skies suddenly opened in 1954 when the Supreme Court, in a unanimous 
decision,  appeared  to  grant  the  organization  everything  it  wanted.  Bell  postulated  three 
reasons for the decision: America’s need to protect its reputation internationally, the need for 
African-Americans to feel that progress could be made home, and the need for the South to go 
from a rural poor economy to a productive one.  
As to  the first,  Bell noted that:  “[Brown] helped to  provide immediate credibility to 
America's struggle with Communist countries to win the hearts and minds of emerging third 
                                                           
13 Maria C. Malagon, Lindsay Perez Huber, Veronica N. Velez, Our Experiences, Our Methods: Using 
Grounded Theory to Inform a Critical Race Theory Methodology, 8 Seattle J. for Soc. Just. 253 (2009). 
14 Law students also played a pivotal role in the development of CRT as pointed out by Delgado, who concludes 
his article by stating:  “A short, final Section draws lessons from the foregoing. One message, hopeful in nature, 
is, simply, that it is hard to kill an idea. A related insight holds that, as much as the establishment might wish to 
confine education to that which it finds useful, it cannot, in the end, do so. A ‘theory of surplus education’--a 
correlate of Marx's famous proposition --holds that if you teach a worker enough mathematics to use a machine 
or operate a cash register, he will use that knowledge to figure out that you are raking off a great deal of profit 
and ask for a raise. If you teach Chicano children to read well enough that they can follow the directions on a bag 
of fertilizer or pesticide, they may also read the rest of the label, including the health warnings, and may one day 
get a lawyer and file a class action against you for personal injury. If you teach grade-school students the 
revolutionary ideals that led to the Boston Tea Party, you may find them using that same rhetoric against you if 
you have been tyrannizing them in the classroom. Like capitalism, education inevitably generates its own 
contradictions and pressures for reform.” See Richard Delgado, Liberal McCarthyism and the Origins of Critical 
Race Theory, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1505 (2009) at 1509 (citations omitted). 
15 Id. at 1511. 
16 Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest Convergence Dilemma, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 518 
(1980) discussing the case, Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that primary school 
assignments sending white and black children to separate schools violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
United States Constitution). 
17 Delgado (2009) at 1507. 6 
world peoples. At least this argument was advanced by lawyers for both the NAACP and the 
federal  government.  And  the  point  was  not  lost  on  the  news  media.  Time  magazine,  for 
example, predicted that the international impact of Brown would be scarcely less important 
than its effect on the education of black children: ‘In many countries, where U.S. prestige and 
leadership  have  been  damaged  by  the  fact  of  U.S.  segregation,  it  will  come  as  a  timely 
reassertion of the basic American principle that ‘all men are created equal.’”
18  
As to the second incentive, Bell observed that Brown “offered much needed reassurance 
to American blacks that the precepts of equality and freedom so heralded during World War II 
might yet be given meaning at home. Returning black veterans faced not only continuing 
discrimination, but also violent attacks in the South which rivaled those that took place at the 
conclusion of World War I.” This disillusionment and anger were poignantly expressed by 
one black actor, Paul Robeson, who in 1949 declared: “It is unthinkable … that American 
Negroes would go to war on behalf of those who have oppressed us for generations … against 
a country such as the Soviet Union which in one generation has raised our people to the full 
human dignity of mankind.”
19 The third impetus was that segregation in the South continued 
to impede it from reaching its full economic potential. These three reasons as driving forces 
behind the decision of the Court in Brown v. Board of Education were illustrative of the 
principle Bell termed “interest convergence.” The interests of the majority converged with the 
interests of the minority, leading to the decision, as opposed to any true desire for equal rights 
for all.  
However, Critical Race Theory, as its parent, Critical Legal Studies, is not defined by 
any one individual or based on any one theoretical  framework. Beginning with  the early 
works  of  Bell  and  Alan  Freeman,
20  and building on the American civil -rights tradition, 
including the works  of such individuals as Martin Luther King, Jr., W.E.B. Du Bois, and 
César Chávez, as well as Continental and postcolonial writers, scholars began to put forward 
the idea that racism is normal, not aberrant, in American society and over time becomes 
natural to those living in it.
21 As a result, scholars argued that formal equality and legal rules 
requiring equal treatment of blacks and whites (prohibiting unlawful direct discrimination  – 
disparate treatment) are capable of redressing only the most dramatic forms of injustice, not 
the more routine forms that target persons of color on a daily basis.  
                                                           
18 Bell (1980) at 524. 
19 Id. at 525. 
20 See for example, Alan Freeman, Race and Class: The Dilemma of Liberal Reform, 90 Yale L. J. 1880 (1981). 
21 See generally Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge ( 2d ed. 2000) 
(covering developments in various areas of this body of scholarship); and Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic, 
Critical Race Theory: An Introduction (2001). 7 
Legal scholarship itself also came under attack by these scholars. Delgado pointed out in 
1984 the importance of scholarship for development of the law, demonstrating how the legal 
scholarship concerning civil rights up to that date was authored predominantly by white male 
legal scholars citing the works of other white male scholars.
22 Delgado named this elite white 
male perspective “imperial scholarship,” arguing that this imperial scholarship in the academy 
was dangerous as it creating limited discourses, ideologies, and perspectives justifying and 
maintaining white superiority, in essence, an apartheid of knowledge was constructed and 
perpetuated in academic research through imperial scholarship. To counter effect this imperial 
scholarship  and  its  inherent  Eurocentricity,  Delgado  emphasized  the  clear  need  for 
scholarship drawing from non-traditional sources of knowledge, a scholarship drawing from 
epistemological, methodological and theoretical perspectives honoring sources of knowledge 
existing outside of the academy and within communities of color.
23 The origins of Critical 
Race Theory as such are traced back to a workshop held outside of Madison, Wisconsin by 
Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989, giving CRT its name.
24 
 
II. The Tenets of CRT 
Though  lacking  any  one  dominant  legal  theoretical  approach,  certain  issues  are  deemed 
integral  to  a  CRT  approach.  Delgado  and  Jean  Stefancic,  when  compiling  an  annotated 
bibliography  of  CRT  research  in  the  early  1990’s,  identified  eleven  themes  running 
throughout CRT scholarship:
25 
 
1.  Critique of liberalism. Most, if not all, CRT writers are discontent with liberalism as a 
means of addressing the American race problem. Sometimes this discontent is only implicit in 
an article's structure or focus. At other times, the author takes as his or her target a mainstay 
of liberal jurisprudence such as affirmative action, neutrality, color blindness, role modeling, 
or the merit principle.    
                                                           
22Richard Delgado, The Imperial Scholar: Reflections on a Review of Civil Rights Literature, 132 U. Pa. L. Rev. 
561-78 (1984).  
23 This failure is interpreted as reluctance a decade later: “[T]here is buried deep inside the legal structure a 
failure to want to ask what I have called the race question .... Stated simply, ‘How does race alter the contours of 
legal reality?”’ Jerome M. Culp, Jr., Neutrality, the Race Question, and the 1991 Civil Rights Act: The 
“Impossibility” of Permanent Reform, 45 Rutgers L. Rev. 965, 966 (1993). 
24 For more on the history of the movement, see Kimberlé Crenshaw et al., Introduction to Critical Race Theory: 
The Key Writings that Formed the Movement (1995); Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, The First Decade: Critical 
Reflections, or “A Foot in the Closing Door” in Francisco Valdes et al. eds., Crossroads, Directions, and a New 
Critical Race Theory (2002); and Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Direction of Critical 
Race Theory and Related Scholarship, 84 Denv. U. L. Rev. 329 (2006). 
25 See Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography, 79 Va. L. Rev. 
461 (1993); and Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, Critical Race Theory: An Annotated Bibliography 1993; A 
Year of Transition, 66 U. Colo. L. Rev. 159 (1995). 8 
2.  Storytelling/counterstorytelling and “naming one's own reality.” Many Critical Race 
theorists consider the majoritarian mindset—the bundle of presuppositions, received wisdom, 
and  shared  cultural  understandings  of  persons  in  the  dominant  group—to  be  a  principal 
obstacle to racial reform. To analyze and challenge these power-laden beliefs, some writers 
employ  counterstories,  parables,  chronicles,  and  anecdotes  aimed  at  revealing  their 
contingency, cruelty, and self-serving nature.
26 
 
3.  Revisionist interpretations of civil rights law and progress. One recurring question for 
Critical scholars is why antidiscrimination law has proven so ineffective in redressing racial 
inequality—or why progress has been cyclical, consisting of alternating periods of advance 
followed by ones of retrenchment. Some Critical scholars address this question by seeking 
answers  in  the  psychology  of  race,  white  self-interest,  the  politics  of  colonialism  and 
anticolonialism, or other sources.  
 
4.  A greater understanding of the underpinnings of race and racism. A number of Critical 
writers  seek  to  apply  insights  from  social  science  writing  on  race  and  racism  to  legal 
problems. For example, understanding how majoritarian society sees black sexuality helps 
explain the law's treatment of interracial sex, marriage, and adoption; knowing how different 
settings  encourage  or  discourage  discrimination  helps  in  deciding  whether  the  movement 
toward Alternative Dispute Resolution is likely to help or hurt disempowered disputants.  
 
5.  Structural  determinism.  A  number  of  CRT  writers  focus  on  ways  in  which  the 
structure  of  legal  thought  or  culture  influences  its  content,  frequently  in  a  status  quo-
maintaining direction. Understanding these constraints results in working more effectively 
towards racial and other types of reform. 
 
                                                           
26 See for example, Derrick Bell, And We Are Not Saved: The Elusive Quest for Racial Justice (1987) at 5-6; 
Patricia Williams, The Alchemy of Race and Rights (1991) at 5-8; Richard Delgado, Storytelling for 
Oppositionists and Others: A Plea for Narrative, 87 Mich. L. Rev. 2411 (1989) (explaining how legal 
storytelling differs from conventional, linear analysis and modes of discourse, and lends itself to transformative 
ideas and legal approaches). Another approach here is “Grounded Theory”, see generally Maria C. Malagon, 
Lindsay Perez Huber, Veronica N. Velez, Our Experiences, Our Methods: Using Grounded Theory to Inform a 
Critical Race Theory Methodology, 8 Seattle J. for Soc. Just. 253 (2009). Grounded Theory is a methodological 
strategy developed by Barney Glaser and Anselm Strauss in their book, The Discovery of Grounded Theory 
(1967) to generate theory from real life experience. Glaser and Strauss challenge positivist conceptions of the 
scientific method, which reigned as the only valid approach to conducting social science research until the 
middle of the last century. The belief that positivist methods were unbiased rejected other possible ways of 
generating knowledge. This use of positivism is argued to contribute to the apartheid of knowledge as it strives 
for a universal science of society, rooted in Western/Eurocentric epistemology.  9 
6.  Race, sex, class, and their intersections. Other scholars explore the intersections of 
race,  sex,  and  class,  pursuing  such  questions  as  whether  race  and  class  are  separate 
disadvantaging  factors,  or  the  extent  to  which  black  women's  interests  are  or  are  not 
adequately represented in the contemporary women's movement. 
 
7.  Essentialism  and  anti-essentialism.  Scholars  who  write  about  these  issues  are 
concerned  with  the  appropriate  unit  for  analysis:  Is  the  black  community  one,  or  many, 
communities? Do middle- and working-class African-Americans have different interests and 
needs? Do all oppressed peoples have something in common? 
 
8.  Cultural nationalism/separatism. An emerging strain within CRT holds that people of 
color can best  promote  their interests through separation  from  the American mainstream. 
Some believe that preserving diversity and separateness will benefit all, not just groups of 
color.  Included  here,  as  well,  are  articles  encouraging  black  nationalism,  power,  or 
insurrection. 
 
9.  Legal institutions, Critical pedagogy, and minorities in the bar. Women and scholars 
of color have long been concerned about representation in law school and the bar. Recently, a 
number of authors have begun to search for new approaches to these questions and to develop 
an alternative, Critical pedagogy.  
 
10.  Criticism  and  self-criticism;  responses.  Under  this  heading  is  included  works  of 
significant criticism addressed at CRT, either by outsiders or persons within the movement, 
together with responses to such criticism.  
 
11.  Critical Race feminism. Included here are works addressing the unique situation of 
women of color (other than intersectionality and essentialism), such as reproductive freedom 
and the social construction of women of color. 
 
The presence of any one of these themes in a work of scholarship sufficed according to 
Delgado and Stefancic for it to be deemed CRT scholarship. Almost twenty years later, the 
themes  integral  to  CRT  scholarship  as  defined  by  Delgado  and  Stefancic  have  been 
condensed by one group of scholars into five basic categories:
27  
                                                           
27 Malagon et al. (2009) at 256-7. 10 
 
1.  The intersectionality of race and racism with other forms of subordination. CRT, as a 
theoretical lens, exposes the centrality of race and racism and the intersection of race and 
racism with other forms of subordination. In the research process, CRT does not simply treat 
race as a variable, but rather works to understand how race and racism intersect with gender, 
class, sexuality, language, etc. as structural and institutional factors that impact the everyday 
experiences  of  People  of  Color.  CRT  critically  frames  race  in  the  research  process  by 
including methodologies that expose the structural and institutional ways race and racism 
influence the phenomena being investigate. 
 
2.  The challenge to dominant ideology. CRT is committed to challenging race-neutral 
dominant ideologies such as meritocracy and colorblindness that have contributed to deficient 
thinking about People of Color. CRT counters deficit thinking within the research process and 
requires critical race researchers to deeply analyze how their research instruments, many of 
which stem from positivist research approaches, may end up affirming the same dominant 
ideologies they strive to challenge in their work. CRT seeks to develop, create, and utilize 
research  methodologies  and  tools  that  can  adequately  capture  the  lived  experiences  of 
communities.  
 
3.  The commitment to social justice. CRT is committed to an anti-racist social justice 
agenda. It seeks to eliminate racism and other forms of subordination. Within the research 
process,  the  goal  of  CRT  is  to  identify,  analyze,  and  transform  the  structural  aspects  of 
education that maintain subordinate and racial positions in and out of the classroom. It also 
intentionally  works  to  empower  participants  through  the  research  process  and  requires 
researchers to reflect on how they employ methods as they enter and leave research sites, 
design interview protocols, and develop reciprocity with the communities that are a part of 
their research. 
 
4.  The  centrality  of  experiential  knowledge.  CRT  strongly  believes  that  the  lived 
experiences of People of Color are instrumental in helping us understand how, and to what 
extent, race and racism mediate everyday life. Connected to this, CRT believes that People of 
Color are creators of knowledge and have a deeply rooted sensibility to name racist injuries 
and identify their origins. Thus, in the CRT research process, there is an explicit attempt to 
employ methodologies that can center and capture the lived experiences of People of Color. 11 
There is also an attempt, where possible, to work jointly with informants and to collectively 
analyze data and build theory as collaborators in the research process. 
 
5.  The transdisciplinary perspective. CRT also utilizes the transdisciplinary knowledge 
and the methodological base of ethnic studies, women's studies, sociology, history, and the 
law in constructing its theoretical premise. This is important to the research process because it 
offers the critical-race researcher an array of research methodologies to consider, especially 
those  methodologies  that  have  developed  in  an  attempt  to  capture  and  understand  the 
experiences of marginalized communities better than more traditional research methods. 
 
Two things are vitally important to understand when approaching CRT. The first is that this 
school of legal theory is not fixed but fluid, and purposefully so. CRT scholars can be seen to 
have agreed to disagree as to the content and course of this school of legal thought. Much as 
with CLS, this lack of a fixed content is perceived by CRT scholars mostly as a strength, and 
less often at times as a weakness, leading to both internal and external criticism.
28  
 
III. Race and Racialization 
The second pivotal issue within a CRT framework is that the use of the term “race” in no way 
refers to any biological understanding of race. Instead, much as the use of gender, it refers to a 
social construct: “Race is not ... simply a matter of physical appearance and ancestry .... [I]t is 
primarily  a  function  of  the  meaning  given  to  these.”
29  Although  race  is  neither  truly 
biologically or scientifically significant, this does not weaken the power of the construction as 
summarized by one scholar:  
 
As a result, I start with the assumption that race and the “one drop of blood” rule are not 
based on any established scientific or biological definition. Of course, that does not mean race 
has no meaning or power in our society. Quite the contrary, race is an intractable force in 
American society touching every facet of day-to-day American life--often affecting where one 
goes to school, the job opportunities presented, who one marries, where one lives, the health 
care one receives, and even where one is interred following death. Race, in other words, 
continues to matter in our society, whether its definitional base is scientific or not. In fact, 
race  has  become  a  more  powerful  factor  in  American  society  because  of  its  social 
                                                           
28 See for example Edward L. Rubin, Jews, Truth and Critical Race Theory, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 525 (1999).  
29 Ian F. Haney López, White by Law (1996). 12 
construction. In sum, race, albeit socially constructed, continues to matter dearly in American 
society.
30  
 
Studies have shown that people continue to make decisions based upon race and proxies for 
race, such as African-sounding names, to discriminate in employment and housing.
31 
Given the premise that race is a social construct, groups of individuals who are not 
necessarily of the same ethnic origins can be “racialized” by society. Here race is used as a 
verb to convey the notion that racialization or using race and its attendant meanings as part of 
a system of assignment is an active and intentional process.
32 Groups that have experienced 
racialization include Asians, Muslims and Arabs.
33 
 
IV. CRT spin-offs 
Dissatisfaction with the original focus of CRT on the situation of African-Americans led to a 
wave of spin-off movements within CRT such as Critical Race Feminism, Latino and Latina 
Critical Schools (LatCrit), Asian American Legal Scholarship and ClassCrits.
 34 Though only 
briefly  discussed  below,  it  is  apparent  that  these  spin-offs  have  paved  the  way  to  an 
intersectionality analysis.  
 
1. Critical Race Feminism 
                                                           
30 Alex M. Johnson, Jr., The Re-emergence of Race as a Biological Category: The Societal Implications- 
Reaffirmation of Race, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 1547 (2009) at 1561; see also Howard Winant, Racial Dualism at 
Century's End in Wahneema Lubiano ed., The House that Race Built (1997) at 87, 89-90: (criticizing 
contemporary racial categories as “North American designations” that are not “in any sense ‘true’ or original 
self-descriptions of the human groups they name” but still finding that the categories matter as a means of 
rendering the social world both intelligible and opaque). 
31 See, e.g.; Angela I. Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name? On Being “Regarded as” 
Black and Why Title VII Should Apply Even if Lakisha and Jamal are White, 2005 Wis. L. Rev. 1283 (2005). 
32 See, e.g., john a. powell, A Minority-Majority Nation: Racing the Population in the Twenty-First Century, 29 
Fordham Urb. L. J. 1395 (2002) at 1415: “Race is the vehicle through which we can include or exclude; stratify 
or equalize; divide or combine .... [R]ace is a verb”; and  Kendall Thomas, The Eclipse of Reason: A Rhetorical 
Reading of Bowers v. Hardwick, 79 Va.L.Rev. 1805 (1993) at 1806:“[R]ace is a verb ... we are ‘raced’ through a 
constellation of practices that construct and control racial subjectivities.” 
33  For discussions of the racialization of Asian-Americans and Arab-Americans as foreign, see Thomas W. Joo, 
Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference and the Construction of Race Before and After 
September 11, 34 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1 (2002)(alleging that “racialized presumptions of ‘Oriental’ 
foreignness and disloyalty ... have consistently influenced Asian American legal history”); Leti Volpp, The 
Citizen and the Terrorist, 49 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1575 (2002); and Adrien Katherine Wing, Civil Rights in the Post 
911 World: Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism, 63 La. L. Rev. 717 (2003) 
(arguing that although “Arabs and Muslims are often stereotyped as dangerous, evil, sneaky, primitive, and 
untrustworthy, much as Blacks are, the criminality has a twist--they are considered potential or actual 
terrorists”). 
34 Athena D. Mutua, The Rise, Development and Future Direction of Critical Race Theory and Related 
Scholarship, 84 Denv. U. L. Rev. 329 (2006) at 330. 13 
Critical Race Feminism can be seen as breaking ground for a concept of intersectionality. 
Critical Race Feminism brought forth the idea that race was too one-dimensional an analysis, 
based on a single axis framework of the experience of African-American men.
35 This theory 
has been successfully argued so that under American federal discrimination law, African 
American women are judicially recognized as a protected class.
36 As the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals expressed it: 
In the absence of a clear expression by Congress that it did not intend to provide 
protection against discrimination directed especially toward black women as a class separate 
and distinct from the class of women and t he class of blacks, we cannot condone a result 
which leaves black women without a viable Title VII remedy.
 37 
The court went on to find that this result was mandated by the holdings of the Supreme 
Court and its own case law in the “sex-plus” cases.
38 In another case decided by the Ninth 
                                                           
35 See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of 
Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. Chi. Legal F. 139, 140 (1989). 
See also Angela Onwuachi-Willig, Another Hairpiece: Exploring New Strands of Analysis under Title VII, 98 
Geo.L.J. 1079 (2010). 
36 See for example as to the early cases, Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833 F.2d 1406, 1416 (10th Cir. 1987)(the 
aggregation of both bases of discrimination was permissible to prove employment discrimination for “the 
removal of artificial, arbitrary and unnecessary barriers to employment when the barriers operate invidiously to 
discriminate on the basis of racial or other impermissible classifications,” citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 
U.S. 424 (1971)); Lewis v. Bloomsburg, 773 F.2d 561 (4th Cir. 1985)(accepting plaintiff's statistical evidence to 
support a class action claim that defendant's hiring practices intentionally or by disparate impact discriminated 
against African-American females who applied for employment); Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action 
Ass’n, 615 F2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980) (citing the Supreme Court decision adopting sex plus in Phillips v. Martin 
Marietta Corp.¸ 400 U.S. 542 (1971) permitting a sub-class of individuals, women with pre-school children to 
claim disparate treatment). That African-American women are now viewed by the courts fairly routinely as a 
protected class can be most recently seen in Oliver v. Napolitano, --- F.Supp.2d ----, 2010 WL 3118383 (D.D.C. 
2010). 
37 Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Ass’n, 615 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1980) at 1032. In the case, 
plaintiff, an African-American female, applied for one of two positions as a field representative. The positions 
were previously staffed by a white female and an African-American male. On the day she submitted her 
application, Jefferies noticed that a “personnel action” had been completed to hire Eddie Jones, an African-
American male, as acting field representative. Jefferies filed a lawsuit alleging race and sex discrimination. 
During the trial, Jefferies submitted uncontroverted evidence that every position for which she applied had been 
filled by males or white females. 
38 The reference to the sex plus cases is in part to the Supreme Court decision in Phillips v. Martin Marietta 
Corp.¸ 400 U.S. 542 (1971) in which the Court accepted the theory of sex plus. In Phillips, plaintiff was denied 
employment by the defendant because she had pre-school-age children. However, defendant employed men with 
pre-school-age children. The district court granted a motion to strike the portion of the complaint which alleged 
that discrimination against females with pre-school-age children violated Title VII. The district court 
subsequently granted defendant's motion for summary judgment because 75 to 80 percent of the positions in 
question were held by females; thus, sex discrimination could not have occurred. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the lower court decision. The Fifth Circuit stated: 
We are of the opinion that the words of the statute are the best source from which to derive the proper 
construction. The statute proscribes discrimination based on an individual's race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin. A per se violation of the Act can only be discrimination based solely on one of the categories, i.e., in the 
case of sex: women vis-a-vis men. When another criterion of employment is added to one of the classifications 
listed in the Act, there is no longer apparent discrimination based solely on race, color, religion, sex or national 
origin. It becomes the function of the courts to study the conditioning of employment on one of the elements 
outlined in the statute coupled with the additional requirement, and to determine if any individual or group is 
being denied work due to his race, color, religion, sex or national origin.  14 
Circuit  Court  of  Appeals,  the  court  recognized  Asian  American  women  as  a  combined 
category.  
 
2. Latino and Latina Critical Schools 
The Latina/o Critical Race Theory (LatCrit) employs CRT to examine the particular ways 
multiple  forms  of  oppression  intersect  to  shape  the  experiences  of  Latinas/os.
  39  LatCrit 
embraces many of the same purpose and traditions of CRT, but focuses on issues relevant to 
Latinas/os where CRT falls short as an analytical lens. Elizabeth Iglesias describes the main 
limitation of CRT as one of scope; namely, that CRT’s preoccupation with a Black/White 
paradigm often narrows its ability to adequately answer questions  about the role of race, 
racism, and other forms of oppression in the lives of Latinas/os, Asian Americans, and other 
Communities  of  Color.
40  Thus, LatCrit, as a branch of CRT, has become an important 
theoretical lens that allows one to more fully examine how multiple forms of oppression 
based  on  immigration  status,  language,  culture,  and  ethnicity,  intersecting  to  shape  the 
experiences of Latinas/os. 
 
3. Asian American Legal Scholarship 
The  focus  of  Asian  American  Legal  Scholarship  has  been  on  the  experience  of  Asian 
Americans in the United States, with one of the central moments being World War II and the 
Japanese internment camps.
41 In the internment cases, religious difference was one aspect of 
Japanese American racial difference constructed by law. Yamamotar has pointed to the 
government's brief filed in the U.S. Supreme Court in  Hirabayashi  v.  United  States,  for 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
The Fifth Circuit found that plaintiff was not refused employment because she was a woman nor because she had 
pre-school age children. It is the coalescence of these two elements that denied her the position she desired. In 
vacating the appellate decision, the Supreme Court stated that “[s]ection 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
requires that persons of like qualifications be given employment opportunities irrespective of their sex. The 
Court of Appeals therefore erred in reading this section as permitting one hiring policy for women and another 
for men--each having pre-school-age children.” 
39 Malagon et al. (2009) at 255-6. 
40See Elizabeth M. Iglesias, International Law, Human Rights and LatCrit Theory 28 U. Miami Inter-Am. L. 
Rev. 177 (1997). 
41 See for example Eric K. Yamamoto, Friend, Foe or Something Else: Social Meanings of Redress and 
Reparations, 20 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 223 (1992) at 223-4: “[A] reparations law's salient meanings lie not in 
the achievement of payments and apologies to a particular group or in symbolic constitutional victories, but in 
the commitment of recipients and others to build upon the reparations process' inter-group linkages and political 
insights to contribute to a broad-based institutional and attitudinal restructuring.” See also Chris K. Iijima, 
Reparations and the “Model Minority” Ideology of Acquiescence: The Necessity to Refuse the Return to 
Original Humiliation, 19 B.C. Third World L.J. 385 (1998); Mari J. Matsuda, Looking to the Bottom Critical 
Legal Studies and Reparations, 22 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 323 (1987); Natsu Taylor Saito, Symbolism Under 
Siege: Japanese American Redress and the “Racing” of Arab Americans as “Terrorists”, 8 Asian L.J. 1 (2001); 
Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations: Japanese American Redress and African American Claims, 40 B.C. L. 
Rev. 477 (1998-1999); and Thomas W. Joo, Presumed Disloyal: Executive Power, Judicial Deference and the 
Construction of Race Before and After September 11, 34 Colum. Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 1 (2002). 15 
example, which relied heavily on a cultural  explanation of race, arguing in  regard to the 
“Japanese Problem on the West Coast” that a “factor to be taken into account in considering 
the  viewpoints  and  loyalties  of  the  West  Coast  Japanese  is  the  existence  and  nature  of 
Shintoism.”
42 The Court accepted the United State Government’s differential treatment on the 
basis of cultural differences which were deemed to give rise to a propensity to espionage and 
sabotage. A lesson to be drawn from the internment of Japanese Americans is that more 
current cultural views of race are not a panacea to scientific racism.
43 
Each of these spin-offs as cursorily discussed above bring aspects into the analysis other 
than simply race, for Critical Race F eminists, sex is an additional lens (as well as more 
recently, age), LatCrits bring to the discussion several factors, immigration status, language, 
culture, ethnicity, and Asian-American Legal scholars, religion and culture, all of which have 
become vital elements in any analysis of race and racialization. 
 
V. Religion as an aspect of the social construct of race 
CRT’s initial focus was on the experience of African Americans. As seen from the spin-off 
theories  above,  this  focus  on  only  African-Americans  was  broadened  fairly  quickly.  The 
original focus on the social condition of African Americans in America can be seen as a 
product of American history; asserting that the nation's entire history is pervaded by racial 
distinctions,
44  the  badges  and  inheritance  of  slavery,  that  divide  its  population  into  a 
dominant, privileged majority and a subordinated, disadvantaged minority. In contrast, in 
Europe historically, religion has been a driving factor of oppression, with social fault lines 
and the mechanisms of oppression often defined in religious terms.
45 
LatCrits and Asian American legal scholarship began to bring issues relating to religion 
more to the fore in CRT.
46 The terrorist bombings of the World Trade Center  in New York 
City on 11 September 2001 and the subsequent backlash against persons of Arab or Muslim 
descent sealed the urgency of such an inclusion: 
In the post-9/11 era, what exactly is meant by race? Race is composed significantly of a 
religious dimension that has not been critically isolated, analyzed or discussed. Islamic 
religious difference has been racialized in the context of the war on terror, just as religious 
differences contributed to the consolidation of Japanese American racial difference dur ing 
                                                           
42 See for example Eric K. Yamamoto, (1992) at 271. 
43 Margaret Chon and Donna E. Arzt, Walking While Muslim, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 215 (2005) at 215-6. 
44 See, however, Forrest Wood, The Arrogance of Faith: Christianity and Race In America from the Colonial Era 
to the Twentieth Century (1990). 
45 See Edward L. Rubin, Jews, Truth and Critical Race Theory, 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 525 (1999) at 531. 
46 See for example, Verna Sánchez, Looking Upward and Inward; Religion and Critical Theory, 19 Chicano-
Latina L. Rev. 431 (1998). 16 
World War II. Yet the existing architecture of domestic and international anti-discrimination 
law  has  avoided  recognizing  racial  discrimination  based  on  religious  group  difference. 
Domestic and international law simultaneously creates and obscures current “Muslim” racial 
identity. The most overt and publicly debated of law's methods in this regard is so-called 
racial profiling. Equally critical, however, is the incompleteness of legal remedies available to 
those targeted by religiously driven racial discrimination. Thus by both its commissions and 
omissions, law is implicated in this process of religioning race.
47  
The racialization of religion can be seen as a now established arena for CRT. 
 
VI. Intersectionality 
Kimberlé Crenshaw expanded Critical Race Theory to Critical Race Feminism to a theory of 
Intersectionality.
48 Intersectionality facilitates a focus on individuals whose subject-positions 
are formed by multiple and hybrid interests, such as through the lens of race, gender, class, 
religion and age. It is seen as “the interplay between individual versus structural sources of 
equality as well as the mutual construction of racism with other forms of “isms,” such as 
class-based oppression, gender-based oppression, and other inequalities  based on religion, 
sexual orientation, immigration status, and so on--what is sometimes called intersectionality 
or simultaneity.”
 49 Intersectionality argues that without “a deep understanding that each of 
these axes of injustice are part and parcel of an overall system and structure of power, in 
which some groups are systematically favored and others disfavored, any efforts at social 
change will only end up repeating the hierarchies but in slightly disguised ways.” 
 
 
 
VII. A Post-Race Approach 
A part of the discourse as to discrimination today in both the United States and Europe is the 
avoidance  of  the  word  “race”  as  being  outdated  and  no  longer  valid  in  today’s  world,  a 
reasoning that can termed post-racialism.
50 A recent American example can be seen where 
Chief Justice John Roberts states in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School 
                                                           
47 Margaret Chon and Donna E. Arzt, Walking While Muslim, 68 Law & Contemp. Probs. 215 (2005) at 215-7: 
 “Walking While Muslim” is a play on the term popularized in the context of African-American racial profiling, 
“Driving While Black.” Both suggest that certain people are being targeted for no legitimate purpose. 
48 Kimberlé Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race & Sex (Richard Delgado ed., 2003) (1989). 
49 Margaret Chon, Remembering and Repairing: The Error Before Us, In Our Presence, 8 Sea.J.Soc.Jus. 643 
(2010) at 648. 
50 See Mario Barnes, A Post-Race Equal Protection? 98 Geo.L.J. 967 (2010) 970, 971. See also Symposium, 
Beyond the Final Frontier: A “Post-Racial” America?,  25 Harv. Blackletter L.J. 1 (2009); Ian F. Haney López, 
Post-racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the Age of Obama, 98 Cal. L. Rev. (2010). 17 
District No. 1, that “the way ‘to achieve a system of determining admission to the public 
schools on a nonracial basis' is to stop assigning students on a racial basis. The way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race.” As Professor 
john powell notes, statements like this, which are frequently made by post-racialists, espouse 
a  “false  universalism”--a  belief  that  every  person  is  equal  and  requires  no  state-provided 
advantage.
51 At the same time, being post-racial eliminates the need for policies addressing 
the continuing legacy of a racist past. In contemporary society , being post-racial means that 
there is no longer a need for affirmative action or other race-based remedies. If society is post-
racial, then race-based remedies are undesirable as a lingering remnant of less enlightened 
times. Affirmative action programs  or other race-conscious remedies  are, by definition, 
inconsistent with a post-racial “reality.” Post-racialism in its current form can be seen as an 
ideology reflecting a belief that due to the significant racial progress that has been made, the 
state  need  not  engage  in  race-based  decision-making  or  adopt  race-based  remedies.
52 
Although post-racialism may be a panacea for those with racial fatigue, it also evinces a type 
of  racial  amnesia --a  desire  to  forget  that  those  marked  by  race  neither  asked  for  the 
designation nor can they escape its present day meanings and effects.
53  
 
Part Two: Race in Swedish Law 
Sweden  has  had  a  long  history  with  the  term  “race”  that  can  be  traced  back  to  one  of 
Sweden’s  most  well-known  scientists,  Carl  Linnaeus,  known  as  the  father  of  modern 
taxonomy. Linnaeus used the term “ras” to categorize human beings into five groups in his 
work, Systema naturae, published in 1735: Africanus, Americanus, Asiaticus, Europeanus 
and Monstrosus.  
Swedish legislation has expressly discriminated against specific groups historically, such 
as the Sami, Romani and Jews. One example is that it was forbidden for the Romani to 
migrant to Sweden from 1914 until after World War II, 1954 when that ban was lifted. In 
1922, the State Institution for Racial Hygiene (Statens institut för rashygien) was established 
in Uppsala. A subtle change occurred after World War II, and the explicitly discriminatory 
laws began to be repealed. Sweden signed several international documents after World War 
II,  including  the  United  Nations  Universal  Declaration  of  Human  Rights,  the  European 
Convention on Human Rights, and ILO conventions concerning protections against unlawful 
discrimination on the basis of race. 
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I.  Sweden’s  International  Commitments  with  respect  to  Combating  Racial 
Discrimination 
The first international instruments prohibiting racial discrimination as signed by Sweden is 
the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1948. Under it, Sweden and all the other member countries (with the 
exception of six) declared in its Article 2 that “[e]veryone is entitled to all the rights and 
freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, 
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status.” Article 7 prescribes that “[a]ll are equal before the law and are entitled without 
any discrimination to equal protection of the law. All are entitled to equal protection against 
any  discrimination  in  violation  of  this  Declaration  and  against  any  incitement  to  such 
discrimination.”  Equal  pay  for  equal  work  is  protected  in  its  Article  23(2),  stating  that 
“[e]veryone, without any discrimination, has the right to equal pay for equal work.”  
Three more instruments were issued by the United Nations in 1966. The United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was signed by Sweden 
in 1966 and ratified in 1971. The United Nations Universal Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights and the United Nations Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights were both 
signed by Sweden in 1967 and ratified in 1971. 
The  European  Convention  for  the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental 
Freedoms
54 was one of the first concrete human rights conventions adopted in the wake of 
World War II, drafted almost directly after the United Nations Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights in 1948. The Convention was signed in Rome in 1950 by the members of the 
Council of Europe,
55 of which Sweden has been a member since its inception in 1949.
56 
Sweden ratified the Convention in 1952.
57 Under Article 14 of the Convention, the signatories 
                                                           
54 For more on the European Convention and Sweden, see Iain Cameron, An Introduction to the European 
Convention on Human Rights (5
th ed. Iustus 2006). For more on the Convention, the European Council and the 
European Court of Human Rights, see the Council’s website at www.coe.int and the Court’s website at 
www.echr.coe.int. 
55 At that time, the Council of Europe consisted of ten Member States: Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, 
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the Council of Europe website at www.coe.int. 
56 See Legislative Bill 1949:214 Kungl. Maj:ts proposition till riksdagen angående godkännande av Sveriges 
anslutning till Europarådet. 
57 The status of the European Convention in Swedish law during this first phase was uncertain, as the issue of 
whether Sweden had a monistic or dualistic system with respect to international obligations was not clear. Two 
cases presenting claims under the European Convention were decided by the Supreme Court and the Supreme 
Administrative Court in 1973 and 1974, respectively. See NJA 1973 p. 423 and RÅ 1974 p. 121. These 
judgments, referred to as the “transformation judgments”, established the principle that foreign treaties had to be 
incorporated or transformed into Swedish law before Swedish citizens could cite them as a direct basis for a 19 
committed to that “[t]he enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention 
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, 
religion,  political  or  other  opinion,  national  or  social  origin,  association  with  a  national 
minority, property, birth or other status.” Two additional acts were required by the signatories 
for  the  implementation  of  the  system  regarding  the  protections  under  the  European 
Convention, recognition of the Council’s jurisdiction to receive individual applications, which 
Sweden  was  the  first  to  do  in  1951,  and  a  declaration  accepting  the  jurisdiction  of  the 
European  Court  of  Human  Rights,  which  Sweden  did  in  1966.  Swede  incorporated  the 
Convention as Swedish law in 1995 a part of the requirements of EU membership. Sweden 
also signed ILO Convention No. 111 on discrimination (employment and occupation), as the 
Swedish Government found that the conditions required to adopt the conventions existed in 
1962.
58  
 
II. Swedish Constitutional Protections as to Unlawful Racial Discrimination 
The Instrument of Government adopted in 1974 to replace that of 1809 was to embody the 
constitutional changes that had successively occurred during the interim. The failure of the 
1809 Instrument of Government to reflect the political reality, and the marginalization of the 
outdated Instrument of Government, is seen as giving rise to a sort of anti-constitutionalism. 
The constitution did not and should not reign in popular sovereignty. A second departure 
consciously taken from the 1809 Instrument of Government was the decision to change the 
balance  of  political  power  from  that  of  separation  of  power  to  a  separation  of  function. 
Parliament is to be the sole legislator as seen from the portal paragraph of the 1974 Instrument 
of  Government:  “All  public  power  in  Sweden  proceeds  from  the  people.”  As  a  result,  a 
comparatively  weak  court  system  was  created  with  only  limited  powers  of  constitutional 
review. This is also clear from the fact that the third branch of political power, after the 
legislative and executive branches, is generally not perceived of as the judicial branch in 
Sweden, but rather the press. The courts were not given a power of judicial review, simply the 
possibility in the case at hand to declare a law in violation of the constitution. If an act of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
remedy. Incorporation entails that the international treaty or convention itself has to be enacted as Swedish 
legislation, while transformation entails that the Parliament in some fashion, either translates the document into 
Swedish or reformulates it to better-fit Swedish law. There is no rule as to which of these two procedures is to be 
applied at any given point, with the Parliament making that decision. The courts ultimately determined that 
Sweden had a dualistic system and consequently, individuals could not raise claims under the Convention until it 
was incorporated as Swedish law in 1995, effective 1998. 
58 Legislative Bill 1962:70 Kungl. Maj:ts proposition till riksdagen rörande ratifikation av Internationella 
arbetsorganisationens konvention (nr 100) angående lika lön för män och kvinnor för arbete av lika värde, m.m., 
Bet. 1962:2LU26, Rskr. 1962:333. 20 
parliament or a government regulation, a higher threshold is required, with a court being able 
to declare it to be so only if manifestly not in compliance with the constitution.  
Within  this  focus  on  majoritarianism,  the  very  first  draft  of  the  1974  Instrument  of 
Government included no individual. After a general outcry, the next draft including a chapter 
on individual rights was adopted in 1974. These individual rights comprised only of five 
articles,  concerning  freedom  of  speech,  expression,  assembly,  demonstration,  association, 
religion and movement, as well as the right to information, protection from forced disclosures 
as  to  associations  or  religion,  protection  from  unlawful  searches  of  person,  home  or 
correspondence, access to public documents and the right for the social partners to take lawful 
industrial actions. 
The chapter two rights were expanded already in 1976, including the addition of Article 
15 stating that no law or other type of legal provision can entail that a citizen is treated less 
favorably on the basis of race, color or ethnic origin. The role of the rights as cataloged in 
chapter two, however, was still greatly debated in certain circles. Those legal scholars in favor 
of  a  weak  judicial  system  argued  that  chapter  two  rights  should  be  more  of  a  policy 
declaration as were certain of the rights in chapter one, and not be meant to serve as a legal 
basis  for  a  remedy.  Instead,  they  should  more  be  meant  to  serve  as  guidelines  for  the 
Parliament in its legislative work, giving precedence to the principles of parliamentary rule 
and popular sovereignty. These different views are reflected in the legislative preparatory 
documents for the 1974 constitution
59 and 1976 amendments.
60 The emphasis in the second 
chapter as to limiting the rights therein contained and the categorization of the rights as 
absolute or qualified rights was part of the compromise finally reached. Absolute rights can 
only be limited by the Instrument of Government, while qualified rights can be limited 
through legislation. In addition, a distinction is made in the Instrument of  Government as to 
those rights accruing to Swedish citizens, and those to non-Swedish citizens.  
 
III. Swedish Ethnic Discrimination Legislation 
A first legislative act prohibiting discrimination on the basis of ethnic origins was passed in 
1986.
61  Statutory  protection against unlawful discrimination on the basis of race, color, 
nationality or ethnic origins was initially legislated in 1986, however, no statutory sanctions 
were enacted, which under Swedish law means that no sanctions can be assessed by the 
                                                           
59 See Legislative Bill 1973:90 med forslag till ny regeringsform och ny riksdagsordning. 
60 See Legislative Bill 1975/76:209 om ändring i Regeringsformen. 
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courts.
62 Containing only seven paragraphs, it simply prohibited ethnic discrimination based 
on race, color, nationality, ethnic origins or religion. The office of an Ombudsman against 
Ethnic  Discrimination  was  created  by  the  1986  act  to  work towards  preventing  ethnic 
discrimination in employment and other societal areas. A second act was passed in 1994 again 
prohibiting discrimination on the basis of race, color, nationality or ethnic origins, enacted to 
mirror in many ways the Sex Equality Act. This time a right to damages and/or to declare a 
decision as to promoting or terminating employment invalid. Two cases were unsuccessfully 
brought under the 1994 act.
63 A new act prohibiting both direct and indirect discrimination on 
the basis of race, color, nationality, ethnic origins, religion or faith in employment was passed 
in 1999 in line with EU law.
64 
The  1999  act   was  replaced  by  the  umbrella  Discrimination  Act  of  2008 
(diskrimineringslag  2008:567)  which  came  into  effect  1  January  2009.
65  The  2008 
Discrimination Act forbids unlawful discrimination on the basis of sex, transgender identity 
or expression, ethnicity, religion or other belief, disability, sexual orientation or age with 
respect to employment, education, labor market policy, starting a business and profession 
recognition, membership in organizations such as labor unions, housing, the provision of 
goods and  services both as provider and as customer, social benefits, social insurance, 
military service and public employment. The 2008 Discrimination Act prohibits unlawful 
discrimination, defined as direct and indirect discrimination, harassment, sexual harassme nt 
and instructions to discriminate. 
In the 2008 Act, ethnic origins is defined as national or ethnic origins or color or other 
comparable conditions. Race has been taken out of the listing in comparison with the previous 
statutes. According to the legislative bill to the 2008 Act, the term “race” was removed from 
the list to demonstrate that a biological concept of race is not accepted, and that the Swedish 
Parliament “has stated that there is no scientific basis for dividing human beings into different 
races and from a biological perspective, consequently there is neither any reason to use the 
                                                           
62 Lag (1986:442) mot etnisk diskriminering. 
63 Lag (1994.134) mot etnisk diskriminering. The first two cases under the Ethnic Discrimination Act were AD 
1997 no. 61 The Swedish Association of Graduate Engineers v. Österåker Municipality (plaintiff, of Greek 
descent, applied for job as system engineer, was not discriminated against by the municipality for not being 
called to an interview as plaintiff requested too high wages, SEK 27 000 per month as opposed to the hired 
candidate’s SEK 20 000) and AD 1998 no. 134, DO v. Otto Farkas Bilskadeverkstad Inc. in Växjö (plaintiff was 
as qualified as the candidate hired, but offered no proof of discriminatory action by defendant despite DO’s 
allegations that the defendant did not evaluate the qualifications in the same manner nor in compliance with 
industry practice, nor asked the same questions nor gave the same opportunity to answer). 
64 Lag (1999:130)  om åtgärder mot etnisk diskriminering i arbetslivet. 
65 An English translation of the 2008 Discrimination Act can be found at the website of the Equality 
Ombudsman of Sweden (“DO”) at www.do.se. The current DO was created in 2009, prior to that, reference to 
DO is prior Ombudsman against Ethnic Discrimination. 22 
word race with respect to human beings. Against this background, and as the use of the word 
“race”  in  legislative  text  risks  inflaming  prejudices,  the  Parliament  has  stated  that  the 
Government is to act in part in the international arena towards that the word “race”, as used 
with respect to human beings, is to as great a degree as possible be avoided in official texts, 
and also in part to review to which extent the term “race” occurs in Swedish laws not based 
on international texts, and as far as possible, suggest a different definition.”
66  
The applications by the Swedish courts of these anti-discrimination laws with respect to 
claims  of  ethnic  discrimination  have  been  restrictive.  The  case  of  the  Labour  Court  is 
summarized below, with a more in depth analysis of one recent case, AD 2009 no. 4.  
 
IV. Claims of Unlawful Ethnic Discrimination in Employment 
Claims of unlawful discrimination in employment are ultimately brought to the Labour Court. 
If the social partners are parties to the lawsuit, the case is brought directly to the Labour 
Court, which then acts as the first and final instance in one hearing. If the case is brought by 
an employee, it is first brought to the general courts and then an appeal can be made to the 
Labour Court. The decisions by the Labour Court cannot be appealed within Sweden as a 
general rule. Claims with respect to ethnic discrimination were first brought under the 1999 
act, as the 1986 act had no sanctions. Of the approximately thirty cases brought up to 2011 
alleging unlawful ethnic discrimination, the Labour Court has only found one case in which 
unlawful ethnic discrimination has been proven as in violation of then applicable 1999 Act,
67 
and one case of unlawful ethnic harassment under the 2008 Act. 
 
In contrast, the Labour Court has found that employers have had a number of “non-
discriminatory” reasons for their employment decisions in the cases that have been brought. A 
review of the case law during the 2000’s shows that the Labour Court has found that an 
employer failing to call a plaintiff of Kosovo-Albanian descent to an interview for a position 
as a truck driver at the hospital was not ethnic discrimination, as those called to the interview 
already knew other employees at the hospital.
68 Not calling a plaintiff of Yugoslavian descent 
                                                           
66 Legislative Bill 2007/08:95 at 119, citing also Constitutional Committee Report 1997/98:KU29. 
67 See AD 2002 no. 128 DO v. Service Companies Employers’ Association and GfK Sverige Inc. in Lund in 
which the Labour Court found that defendant had indirectly discrimination against plaintiff by applying a 
requirement of “clear” Swedish that was higher than necessary for the position. In AD 2005 no. 21 The Swedish 
Municipal Workers’ Union and A.Ö. on Ingarö v. Tbe Association of Healthcare Companies and Attendo Care 
Inc. in Stockholm, the plaintiff, a Jehovah’s witness, could not participate in certain employment activities due to 
her religious beliefs, such as decorating a Christmas tree. The Labour Court did not find discrimination on the 
basis of religion in the case, but found that plaintiff was constructively terminated from her employment and that 
the employer had violated LAS.  
68 AD 2006 no. 60 The Swedish Municipal Workers’ Union v. Skåne Region in Kristianstad. 23 
to an interview was not discrimination even though plaintiff was theoretically as qualified as 
those called, as he had less practical experience according to the defendant’s assessment.
69 
That a plaintiff from Kosovo was not hired by the defendant municipality for the position of 
building permit architect because of deficient Swedish was not discrimination despite the fact 
that plaintiff had received a university degree from a Swedish university and later received the 
same position with a different municipality.
70 The fact that plaintiff submitted an employment 
application within the deadline set by  the job advertisement, but defendant hired another 
Swedish candidate prior to the deadline, was not discrimination.
71 Where plaintiff of Iranian 
background had applied for a job as pre -school teacher via fax, the Labour Court found it 
doubtful that the school had received the application as it claimed it did not, as the school 
would have been eligible for more funding if they had hired any person for the position, thus 
there was no motive for the school to discriminate.
72 Plaintiff of Russian background sent in 
an application and was asked to call for an interview, but when plaintiff called, she was not 
scheduled for an interview.  
The Labour Court found that the employer did not discriminate against her on the basis 
of her Russian accent, but rather because during the telephone call, defendant discovered that 
plaintiff had not gone to a three -year high school program in Sweden and she had not 
submitted additional information concerning her education in Russia.
73 Plaintiff of Algerian 
descent was not hired for overtime work despite his being first on the list for such work in the 
company, but this was not discrimination as the signalmen refused to work with him for 
safety reasons.
74 Plaintiff of Iranian descent was not called to an interview during a telephone 
conversation, but it was not discrimination as defendant’s employee felt that plaintiff was 
aggressive  and  not  suitable  for  the  position.
75  Plaintiff  of  Bosnian  descent  was  not 
                                                           
69 AD 2005 no. 126 The Swedish Association of Graduate Engineers v. Klippan Municipality. 
70 AD 2005 no. 98 DO v. Norrköping Municipality. 
71 AD 2005 no. 7 N.K. in Norrköping v. Nor Di Cuhr Inc. in Norrköping. 
72 AD 2005 no. 14 The Swedish Teachers’ Union v. ALMEGA Service Employers’ Associations and K.E.M. in 
Skarpnäck. 
73 AD 2005 no. 3 DO v. Comsol Inc. in Stockholm. 
74 AD 2004 no. 22 A.K.T. in Malmö v. Copenhagen Malmö Port Inc. in Malmö. 
75 AD 2003 no. 73 DO v. The Swedish Metal Trades Employers’ Association and Westinghouse Atom Inc. in 
Västerås. Other cases decided against plaintiffs in 2003 are AD 2003 no. 58 DO v. Swede-Eye Inc. in Täby (no 
discrimination when the 27 year old plaintiff, with education as hotel receptionist, experience as a hotel 
receptionist as well as five years’ experience as a personal assistant but no sales experience, was not called to job 
interview and instead a 19 year old candidate with experience from MacDonald’s and a video store after high 
school was hired), AD 2003 no. 55 DO v. The Swedish Social Insurance Administration and Jämtland County’s 
General Social Insurance Administration in Östersund (no discrimination when plaintiff, the only one with a 
foreign background of twelve hired temporarily, was not also permanently hired as were the other eleven. The 
employer found that she was not sufficiently cooperative and did not adjust herself to the demands of the 
employer as evidenced by her failure to participate in internal educations, from which for one she had received a 
dispensation for a trip abroad and had attended seven, and that she also had requested a wage increase) and in 
2002, AD 2002 no. 54 L.G-C. in Haverdal v. Boods Färg, S.K. Inc. in Halmstad (plaintiff, of Israeli descent, not 24 
discriminated against with  respect  to  a promotion  when the  employer  sent  the successful 
Swedish  male  candidate  to  a  course  after  the  applications  were  sent  in  that  was  used  a 
deciding  qualification  for  the  male  candidate.
76  Questions  posed  by  labor  union 
representatives as to whether the male Palestinian candidate could work with women were not 
unlawful discrimination by the employer.
77 The Labour Court found that the employer was 
not liable for the actions of receptionist who sent letter to a job applicant from Iran, informing 
him that his application was rejected as it had too many spell ing mistakes, as it was not 
proven that the employer ordered the receptionist to do this.
78 That the employer chose the 
one of the two candidates that spoke flawless Swedish was not unlawful discrimination.
79  
In one case, plaintiff, who was of the Muslim faith and wore a purdah, had been called to 
an interview after a telephone conversation.
80  At the interview, plaintiff was told by the 
person hiring that “I don’t care what people have for religion, but you unfortunately cannot 
have those clothes on you when you demo, because you are our face to the customer.”
81 In 
addition, the woman stated that “I live in Malmö where the most common name nowadays is 
Mohammed” and that  she was  used to  seeing  people from  all corners of the world. The 
defendant employer admitted that the employee had said these things to the plaintiff, but that 
the woman had already hired someone else just seconds before the interview and felt she 
could not inform the plaintiff of this. Accepting this as the course of events, the Labour Court 
found that there was no discrimination as the position (a temporary position demonstrating 
food products) had already been filled.  
In the cases that have been brought in the past two years, the Labour Court has stated that 
the employer did not unlawfully discriminate on the basis of ethnic origins as the candidate 
had included only a telephone number, and had not included her home address or her age.
82 
Despite the fact that the employer hired three ethnic Swedish candidates with equivalent 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
discriminated against though she was qualified for the job and employer defendant knew she was of a minority 
during the job interview, question was whether a representative of the employer informed plaintiff during the 
interview that she would not receive the job because of her skin color after singing “Hallelujah” during the 
interview. The Labour Court found that the person committing these acts at the interview was not a 
representative of the company). 
76 AD 2006 no. 96 SECO v. The State of Sweden.  
77 Under the 1999 act, only employers could be liable for unlawful discrimination, labor unions had no such 
liability. AD 2007 no. 17 DO v. Örebro Municipality. 
78 The Labour Court seemed to give the fact that the employer, after receiving the notice from DO of 
discrimination, gave the plaintiff a job interview (although he was not hired), see AD 2007 no. 45 DO v. Laika 
Film & Television. 
79 AD 2008 no. 47. This case can be compared with the only successful case claiming unlawful ethnic 
discrimination on the basis of the level of Swedish required, see AD 2002 no. 128. There is no clear line of 
demarcation between these cases. 
80 AD 2003 no. 63 DO v. DemÅplock in Gothenburg Inc. in Lindome. 
81 Id. at 496 and 500. 
82 AD 2009 no. 11 DO v. Almega Tjänsteföretaget and First Rent A Car. 25 
education  but  less  work  experience  than  the  plaintiff,  the  employer  did  not  unlawfully 
discriminate against the plaintiff with a Bosnian background. The ethnic Swedes who were 
hired were more personally suitable as the employer found them to be better team players 
than the Bosnian candidate who was considered too individualistic.
83 It was not unlawful 
ethnic discrimination nor constructive termination when the employer told the employee at a 
personnel party that he spoke poor Swedish and ought to go to a Swedish course as well  as 
ought to speak Swedish with his daughters and father -in-law. The employee alleged in 
addition that the employer continued by saying, “You Serbs are the worst type of people, all 
you do is fight, you can see that from the history of Yugoslavia, you started all the wars.” The 
Labour Court, finding that it was simply word against word as to the latter statement, held that 
the  employer  had  not  in  any  way  acted  unlawfully  or  in  violation  of  good  labor  market 
practices.
84  In  another  case,  the  employer  finding  t he  ethnic  Swedish  candidate  more 
personally  suitable  was  not  unlawful  discrimination,  as  the  second  generation  Swedish 
Macedonian  candidate  had  misstated  and  placed  her  paid  parental  leave  under  the 
employment category in the application as opposed to unde r a different, miscellaneous 
category. That the interview was conducted in a manner that appeared more towards checking 
the candidate’s Swedish competence as opposed to her professional qualifications was not 
unlawful ethnic discrimination in the view of the court.
85 A location chief for an association 
who raised questions as to the Muslim faith, unfaithful women, wearing a veil, and using the 
term “Halal pork” did not understand that the two hourly employees, young Muslim women, 
found  the  statements  discriminatory,  thus  no  unlawful  discrimination  had  occurred  at  the 
workplace.
86 
A recent case that can be seen as taking the interpretation of the law to its outermost 
boundaries is AD 2009 no. 4. In this case, the plaintiff employee, originally from Gambia and 
having lived in Sweden for twenty-two years, was working as a rehabilitation assistant at a 
care facility for autistic adults for the municipality of Härryda, a public employer. He had 
worked at this facility  since 2002.  In 2004 a new head of the facility w as appointed, 
Andersson. Plaintiff alleged that Andersson made statements such as that plaintiff took such 
good care of the patients because he used voodoo, and that they did what he requested them to 
do because they were afraid of him since he was big and black. Plaintiff alleged that he made 
it clear to Andersson that he thought such statements inappropriate. In addition, he alleged 
                                                           
83 AD 2009 no. 16 DO v. Svensk Handel et al. 
84 AD 2009 no. 27 Union of Commercial Employees v. Gunnar Johansson Järn o Trädgård AB. 
85 AD 2009 no. 87 DO v. Eslöv’s Municipality. 
86 AD 2010 no. 21 DO v. Idea, and IF Friskis & Svettis. 26 
that three other of the employees called him names such as “Blackey”, “Big Black Bastard”, 
“Black Head”, “The African”, “Kunta Kinte”, “gangsta” and also told him that they did not 
understand what he said. At an employee review in 2006, Andersson informed plaintiff that 
none of the employees wanted to work with him, but refused to tell him who or why. The day 
after, the plaintiff wrote down his reaction to this conversation and had it read by another 
employee to all the employees on 14 February 2006. Plaintiff continued to work until almost 
two months later when he received written notice on 10 April 2006 that he need not come to 
work as well as a warning. Orally he was informed that the other employees were afraid of 
him.  The  municipality  had  not  involved  the  union  in  this  proceeding  as  required  by  the 
collective agreement. He was not given written notice of the reason for these actions until 1 
June 2006 after the union became involved. He was forced to stay home for 37 days and then 
transferred to another work place. The municipality alleged that it did not know that plaintiff 
had felt discriminated against so that it had no duty to investigate. The municipality also 
alleged  that  the  letter  written  by  plaintiff  was  threatening  and  that  Andersson  knew  that 
something needed to be done at the work place. 
The Labour Court began with the statements made by the unit head, Andersson, finding it 
strange that if she had made such statements often, that none of the other employees had 
heard them, thus DO had not met the burden of proof with respect to them. As to the other 
employees calling plaintiff names such as “Big Black Bastard”, “Black Head”, “The African”, 
“Kunta Kinte” and “gangsta”, the Labour Court again found that none of the other employees 
had heard such and thus  the behavior was  not proven. However, there was  banter at  the 
workplace, including the use of nicknames such as “Blackey”, to which plaintiff responded at 
times with “Whitey.” The Labour Court found that as plaintiff had participated in this banter, 
the employer had no reason to believe that it was inappropriate and discriminatory, and as 
such, no duty to investigate. The Labour Court did assess damages due to the employer’s 
failure to involve the union with respect to the order to stay home from work. 
The second victory with respect to claims of ethnic discrimination is also the most recent 
one addressed by the Labour Court. In the case, two women, one originally from Bosnia and 
the other from the former Soviet Union, were in the employ of a municipality. They were 
subjected to both sexual and ethnic harassment by their group leader, who eventually was 
promoted up to unit leader. The group leader referred to them as “Eastern girls” instead of by 
name,  and  put  a  sexually  graphic  picture  up  in  the  personnel  lunch  room  as  Christmas 
greetings two years in a row, 2006 and 2007. The leader was promoted to a management 
position in the municipality, no longer directly the women’s boss, and in 2008 he emailed the 27 
picture to them as a Christmas greeting. The women had informed the man that they found the 
behavior offensive. Finally the two women filed complaints with the municipality and the 
Discrimination  Ombudsman,  as  well  as  reported  him  to  the  police.  The  court  found  the 
municipality liable to pay damages for the sexual and ethnic harassment in the amount of 
SEK 35,000 (app. € 3,800) to  one of the plaintiffs,  but  that only sexual  harassment  was 
proven with respect to the other plaintiff with damages set at SEK 25,000 (app. € 2,700). 
However,  the  divided  court  ordered  that  the  parties  bear  their  own  legal  fees  and  costs, 
resulting in a somewhat pyrrhic victory.
87 The interesting aspect here is that the damages for 
sexual harassment are based on the 2008 Christmas email, with the Court emphasizing that 
the women had notified the man in May 2008 that they found the picture offensive, this his 
knowledge of this was proven. This is close  to the reasoning in the Blackey case, where the 
Court found that those persons using such terms had no knowledge they were offensive as the 
plaintiff had voluntarily participated in the banter. Here the women had notified the man that 
they found the picture offensive, so that he could not claim that he did not understand the 
picture could be offensive. The dissenting member of the Court stated that the picture, 
“against  the  flow  of  pictures  with  nudity  and  satirical  content  that  today  flood  Swedish 
society” cannot be seen as particularly remarkable, and that it was not proven that the sender 
tried to influence the two women sexually or try to communicate anything sexual. Thus the 
dissenting member of the Court did not find any sexual harassment had occurred.  
 
3 Analysis of the case law of the Labour Court through a CRT Lens 
Under the burden of proof as set out in the 1999 Ethnic Discrimination Act as well as the 
current  2008  Discrimination  Act,  the  plaintiff  is  to  show  circumstances  indicating  that 
unlawful discrimination has occurred, and then the burden of proof is to shift to the employer 
to prove that no unlawful discrimination has occurred. As can be seen in many of the cases 
above, when the Labour Court has come to the conclusion that it is word against word, it has 
found that the plaintiff has not made the necessary showing required for the burden of proof 
to shift to the employer.  
Several aspects can be raised from a Critical Race Perspective as to the judgments in 
these cases. The first is that of interest convergence, as argued originally by Professor Derrick 
Bell with respect to Brown v. Board of Education. In the Swedish context, the argument 
would run that Sweden adopted its discrimination legislation for many of the same reasons as 
the United States Supreme Court decided the Brown v. Board of Education case, basically 
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first due to international pressures. Sweden began signing international documents by which 
Sweden assumed the obligation to protect individuals against unlawful discrimination on the 
basis of race already in 1948. However, under the system of dualism as exists in Sweden, 
such international obligations cannot be cited as grounds for a remedy by a Swedish citizen 
within  Sweden  until  legislated  into  Swedish  law,  which  first  occurred  in  1986  with  no 
sanctions, and in 1994 with sanctions. The other prong of interest convergence that can be 
seen as compelling here is the need for Sweden to pacify her now more culturally diverse 
citizenry of hers intentions of protecting the rights of all citizens regardless of ethnic origins. 
Another of the original observations of CRT in the American context is also pertinent 
here, that issues of discrimination cannot be resolved in the liberal belief of the equal worth of 
all  persons  before  the  law  regardless  of  anything  else.  The  persons  before  the  law  in 
discrimination cases are not identical, but despite this, the Labour Court treats individuals 
claiming discrimination exactly the same as the employers, despite inequalities with respect to 
legal and financial resources. In the Blackey case, the employer knew of the racially-tinged 
banter in the workplace at the same time as it claimed it knew that there were conflicts in the 
same workplace, but that one was not related to the other. In other words, it was totally 
plausible to the Labour Court that a workplace could have racially-based “fun” banter at the 
same  time  as  according  to  the  employer,  there  were  enormous  conflicts  at  that  same 
workplace, and the  Labour Court found no cause to  impose a duty to  investigate on the 
employer. Another aspect of the banter, in addition to it being banter as the plaintiff consented 
to it, was whether there was an alternative course of action for the plaintiff that would not 
have  been  considered  threatening.  Even  in  the  most  recent  case,  the  Labour  Court  has 
required plaintiffs to prove defendant had knowledge as to the offensiveness of the conduct at 
issue, in essence, heightening the burden of proof in such cases. As seen from the case law 
above, when any of the persons of non-Swedish background have attempted to assert their 
rights, they have been deemed as threatening, too individualistic, not team players, etc. From 
the  rulings  by  the  Labour  Court,  there  are  no  alternatives  available  for  persons  of  non-
Swedish ethnic origins. The parties before the Labour Court, in the eyes of the Labour Court, 
are equal. 
The  last  aspect  that  can  be  taken  from  CRT  here  is  the  analysis  of  the  post-racial 
discourse. As seen from the legislative bill for the 2008 Discrimination Act, the Swedish 
Parliament has decided that the word “race” is not an appropriate term and is not to be used. 
However, there is nothing yet with which this vacuum is to be filled. In addition, without an 
understanding of race as a social construct, the courts will always be free to find that certain 29 
behaviors fall outside of any listing. In addition, as warned by many CRT scholars, taking 
race out of the discourse glosses over not only the history of its coinage, but also the present 
state of affairs, and as can be seen from the case law above, is definitely a premature step in 
the Swedish context. 
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